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SYMPOSIUM




Central bank money or liquidity is at the heart of modern economies.1
It is issued against collateral designated as eligible by, and on terms defined
by, central bank collateral frameworks,2 which are the focus of this Essay.
Walter Bagehot’s well-known dictum posits that in a liquidity crisis, central
banks should act as lenders of last resort by lending freely against good collat-
eral at penalty rates. 3  The good collateral requirement ensures that a bor-
rower is illiquid rather than insolvent.4  Yet in a financial crisis, it can be
difficult—if not impossible—to distinguish between an illiquid and an insol-
vent firm.  However, what is often underappreciated is that the ultimate prac-
tical difference between an illiquid and an insolvent firm is whether a firm
has assets a central bank, such as the Federal Reserve, will accept as collateral
for lending or for purchase, and at what valuation.  What ultimately consti-
tutes “good” or central bank “eligible” collateral, how best to assess its value,
© 2021 Colleen M. Baker.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Essay in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes, so
long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review,
and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Assistant Professor of Legal Studies, Price College of Business and Affiliate Faculty,
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1 Kjell G. Nyborg, Central Bank Collateral Frameworks 1 (Swiss Fin. Inst. Rsch. Paper
Series, Working Paper No. 15-10, 2015), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2576075.
2 Id.
3 See WALTER BAGEHOT, LOMBARD STREET: A DESCRIPTION OF THE MONEY MARKET
196–99 (New York, Scribner, Armstrong & Co. 1873).
4 Kathryn Judge, The Federal Reserve: A Study in Soft Constraints, 78 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., no. 3, 2015, at 65, 78 n.69 (explaining that some have interpreted Bagehot’s good
collateral requirement to limit such lending to solvent institutions).
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and whose perspective on these questions matters most are critical issues at
the heart of central bank collateral frameworks.
In the financial crisis of 2007–09,5 Federal Reserve officials explained
that the investment bank Lehman Brothers lacked the collateral necessary to
secure its liquidity assistance.6  Consequently, the bank filed for Chapter 11
bankruptcy on September 15, 2008.7  On the following day, the Federal
Reserve rescued the multinational insurer American International Group
(AIG).8  Six months earlier, it had rescued the investment bank Bear
Stearns.9  All three firms were important players in the shadow banking or
market-based credit system.10  To collateralize their significant levels of short-
term borrowing, all three firms had relied upon assets that, in the financial
crisis, markets came to view as questionable.11  Once markets lost faith in the
quality of the firms’ assets, the firms could no longer secure market funding.
The Federal Reserve was their last resort.  And the respective histories of
these firms attest to the centrality of collateral and central bank collateral
frameworks in modern credit markets.
The importance of central bank collateral frameworks extends beyond
defining the terms upon which central banks provide liquidity or purchase
assets.  The institutional features of these frameworks, which are a result of
legislation and central bank policy, can influence the production, liquidity,
and pricing of assets that markets use as collateral.12  Collateral frameworks
can also impact market discipline and enable indirect bailouts of firms and
governments.13  Those with assets a central bank such as the Federal Reserve
will buy benefit from a wealth effect.14  The Federal Reserve recently
5 For simplicity, this Essay uses the phrase “financial crisis” to refer to the financial
crisis of 2007–09 unless otherwise noted.
6 See Laurence Ball, The Fed and Lehman Brothers 2 (July 2016) (unpublished man-
uscript) (https://data.nber.org/data-appendix/w22410/The%20Fed%20and%20Lehman
%20Brothers.pdf) (arguing Lehman Brothers had the collateral necessary to secure the
central bank’s funding).
7 Id. at 1.
8 Id. at 44.
9 Id. at 26.
10 See id. at 1.
11 See id. at 21–22.  AIG’s near collapse is generally discussed in the context of its prob-
lematic credit-default swaps activity. See, e.g., William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The AIG Bailout, 66
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 943, 959–61 (2009).  However, its securities lending activities also
contributed to its troubles. See Hester Peirce, Securities Lending and the Untold Story in the
Collapse of AIG 4 (Mercatus Ctr., George Mason Univ., Working Paper No. 14-12, 2014),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2435161.
12 See Kjell G. Nyborg, Collateral Frameworks: The Open Secret of Central Banks, VOXEU
(Jan. 24, 2017), https://voxeu.org/article/how-central-bank-collateral-frameworks-distort-
economy.
13 See id.
14 Lev Menand, Unappropriated Dollars: The Fed’s Ad Hoc Lending Facilities and the Rules
That Govern Them 25 (ECGI, Law Working Paper No. 518/2020, 2020), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3602740.
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announced its intention to continue purchasing assets to support markets
and to promote accommodative financial conditions.15
Post–financial crisis reforms and the continuing growth of the market-
based credit system have fueled the importance of collateral securities in
global financial markets.  Yet while many economists16 and legal scholars17
have analyzed last resort lending by central banks and the shadow banking
system itself,18 few have focused on collateral and central bank collateral
frameworks.19  This shortfall is problematic.  Market participants consider
these frameworks a key consideration in collateral markets.20
This Essay begins to close this gap in the legal scholarship.  As it
explains, collateral frameworks are institutional features of central banks that
define the terms upon which central bank money is allocated in modern
economies.  Such allocations not only have survival implications for firms
such as Lehman Brothers, but they can also impact credit allocation21 and
wealth distribution in society.22  Increased academic scrutiny of these founda-
15 See FED. RSRV., MINUTES OF THE FEDERAL OPEN MARKET COMMITTEE 9 (2020).
16 See, e.g., Paul Tucker, The Lender of Last Resort and Modern Central Banking: Principles
and Reconstruction, in BIS PAPERS NO. 79, RE-THINKING THE LENDER OF LAST RESORT 10,
27–28 (2014); Dietrich Domanski & Vladyslav Sushko, Rethinking the Lender of Last Resort:
Workshop Summary, in RE-THINKING THE LENDER OF LAST RESORT, supra, at 1, 1–5; Mark A.
Carlson & David C. Wheelock, The Lender of Last Resort: Lessons from the Fed’s First 100 Years
32–40 (Fed. Rsrv. Bank of St. Louis, Working Paper No. 2012-056B, 2013), https://
ssrn.com/abstract=2173391.
17 See, e.g., Colleen Baker, The Federal Reserve as Last Resort, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 69,
90–97 (2012); José Gabilondo, Financial Hospitals: Defending the Fed’s Role as a Market Maker
of Last Resort, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 731, 732 (2013); Kathryn Judge, The First Year: The Role
of a Modern Lender of Last Resort, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 843, 850–58 (2016).
18 See, e.g., MORGAN RICKS, THE MONEY PROBLEM: RETHINKING FINANCIAL REGULATION 3
(2016); Christina Parajon Skinner, Nonbank Credit, 9 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 149, 160 (2019).
19 For two notable exceptions, see generally KJELL G. NYBORG, COLLATERAL
FRAMEWORKS: THE OPEN SECRET OF CENTRAL BANKS (2016) and MANMOHAN SINGH, COLLAT-
ERAL MARKETS AND FINANCIAL PLUMBING (3d ed. 2020).  Singh states that “[n]o other mar-
ket [besides the market for collateral] is so critical to the functioning of the financial
system, and yet so poorly understood.”  Manmohan Singh, Collateral in Financial Plumbing,
in COLLATERAL MARKETS AND FINANCIAL PLUMBING, supra, at 7, 7.
20 BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, CENTRAL BANK OPERATING FRAMEWORKS AND COLLAT-
ERAL MARKETS § 3, at 19 (2015) (noting that eighty percent of responding market partici-
pants surveyed stated that central bank collateral frameworks were a “‘very’ or ‘somewhat’
important element with respect to their participation in collateral markets”).
21 See, e.g., Kathryn Judge, Why the Fed Should Issue a Policy Framework for Credit Policy 1,
6–7 (Ctr. for L. & Econ. Stud., Columbia Univ. Sch. of L., Working Paper No. 632, 2020),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3716600 (arguing that the Federal Reserve should provide a
framework to illuminate the credit facilities it created to confront the economic fallout of
the coronavirus crisis).
22 See Edward Luce, Opinion, America’s Dangerous Reliance on the Fed, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 3,
2021), https://www.ft.com/content/bcb8d4d9-ca6d-45b7-aafc-9e9ecf672a5b (noting that
the Federal Reserve’s extraordinary market interventions during crises have implications
for wealth inequality); see also Judge, supra note 4, at 65 (noting that “the Fed’s actions can
have significant distributional consequences”).
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tional frameworks should help to promote central bank transparency,
accountability, and oversight.23
This Essay is the first step in a broader normative project analyzing the
proper balance between legislation and central bank policy—between archi-
tecture and implementation—in shaping the Federal Reserve’s collateral
framework to best promote market discipline and to minimize credit alloca-
tion.  Its modest aim is twofold.  First, it provides the first analysis of central
bank collateral frameworks in the legal scholarship.  Second, it analyzes the
equilibrium between legislation and central bank policy in the Federal
Reserve’s collateral framework in the context of its section 13(3) emergency
liquidity authority, lending authority for designated financial market utilities,
and swap lines with foreign central banks, and general implications of these
arrangements.
Part I addresses the role of collateral in financial markets, specifically in
the market-based credit system.  Part II turns to central bank liquidity provi-
sion and collateral frameworks, particularly in the context of the Federal
Reserve.  It demonstrates that via their collateral frameworks, central banks
such as the Federal Reserve act in and are acted upon by markets.  Part III
analyzes the equilibrium between legislation and central bank policy in the
Federal Reserve’s collateral framework in the context of three emergency
facilities and general implications of these arrangements.  The Essay then
concludes.
I. COLLATERAL AND THE SHADOW BANKING/MARKET-BASED CREDIT SYSTEM
This Part first provides a brief overview of collateral’s central role in the
shadow banking or market-based credit system.  It then examines the sys-
tem’s fragility and the instability triggered by problems in collateral flows.
A. Sketch of the Shadow Banking System
As the shadow banking system grew prior to the financial crisis, collateral
use by markets “rose exponentially,”24 especially levels of “cash equivalent
instruments.”25  The shadow banking26 or market-based credit system now
23 See Kathryn Judge, A Different Take on the AIG Case: The Dangers of Invoking 19th Cen-
tury Principles to Solve 21st Century Problems, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (June 23, 2015), https://
clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2015/06/23/another-take-on-aig-the-dangers-of-invoking-
19th-century-principles-to-solve-21st-century-problems/ (arguing that principled guidelines
for the Fed’s use of its discretionary authorities promote accountability and improve
oversight).
24 Manmohan Singh & Peter Stella, Money, Collateral and Safe Assets, in COLLATERAL
MARKETS AND FINANCIAL PLUMBING, supra note 19, at 81, 81.
25 Daniel K. Tarullo, Member, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Evaluating Pro-
gress in Regulatory Reforms to Promote Financial Stability (May 3, 2013).  Morgan Ricks
notes the following to be a nonexclusive list of such instruments: “financial commercial
paper; asset-backed commercial paper; Eurodollars; short-term repurchase agreements;
securities lending collateral delivery obligations; auction rate securities; and money market
mutual fund shares.”  Morgan Ricks, The Money Problem: Rethinking Financial Regulation,
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provides as much credit—if not more lending—than the traditional banking
system.27  However, the systems are symbiotic.  Prior to the financial crisis,
“[l]arge banks sponsored shadow banking entities such as Structured Invest-
ment Vehicles (SIVs), money market funds, asset-backed commercial paper
conduits, and auction rate securities.  These firms also dominated the under-
writing of assets purchased by entities within the shadow banking system.”28
The systems’ interconnectedness risks the transmission of vulnerabilities and
shocks between them.29  For example, in the financial crisis, shadow banking
institutions turned to the traditional banking system for credit and liquidity
assistance30 via lines of credit when investors pulled back from funding their
securities.31  Since the financial crisis, the shadow banking system has only
continued to increase in volume,32 and in its “products, services, and finan-
cial models.”33  Its growth has “relied on the increased use of collateral as
complementary ‘liquid’ assets beyond bank reserves.”34
In the shadow banking system, financial intermediation occurs via secur-
ities markets rather than depository institutions.  In many ways, the shadow
banking system looks, smells, and acts like traditional banking.  A significant
part of it consists of short-term lending via repurchase agreements (“repo”)
that is used to fund longer-term securities assets.  The accompanying reuse of
securities collateral is “identical to the money creation that takes place in
commercial banking through the process of accepting deposits and making
loans.”35  Collateral flows drive credit creation as much as money itself.36
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Mar. 15, 2016), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/
2016/03/15/the-money-problem-rethinking-financial-regulation/.
26 See Zoltan Pozsar, Tobias Adrian, Adam Ashcraft & Hayley Boesky, Shadow Banking,
FED. RSRV. BANK N.Y. ECON. POL’Y REV., Dec. 2013, at 1 (defining shadow banks as “finan-
cial intermediaries that conduct maturity, credit, and liquidity transformation without
explicit access to central bank liquidity or public sector credit guarantees”).  Global
shadow banks’ assets are around $52 trillion, a 75% increase from 2010.  Jeff Cox, Shadow
Banking Is Now a $52 Trillion Industry, Posing a Big Risk to the Financial System, CNBC (Apr.
11, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/04/11/shadow-banking-is-now-a-52-trillion-indus-
try-and-posing-risks.html.
27 See Menand, supra note 14, at 58 (stating that “the shadow banking system has
grown to displace the banking system in size and scope”); Randal K. Quarles, Vice Chair
for Supervision, Fed. Rsrv., The Financial Stability Board’s Roadmap for Addressing NBFI
Vulnerabilities (Oct. 20, 2020) (noting that globally, the nonbank financial intermediation
sector accounts for about half of all financial intermediation).
28 Tarullo, supra note 25, at 2–3.
29 See Quarles, supra note 27; see also Laura E. Kodres, Shadow Banks: Out of the Eyes of
Regulators, INT’L MONETARY FUND, https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/basics/
52-shadow-banking.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2021) (discussing interconnections between
shadow banks and traditional banks).
30 See Quarles, supra note 27.
31 See Donald L. Kohn, Vice Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the U.S. Fed. Rsrv. Sys.,
Money Markets and Financial Stability (May 29, 2008).
32 Kodres, supra note 29.
33 Quarles, supra note 27.
34 Singh & Stella, supra note 24, at 85.
35 Singh, supra note 19, at 9.
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The arrangement mimics the traditional banking system’s use of short-term
lending (via demand deposits) to fund longer-term assets.  Consequently, it
also has the fragile maturity mismatch between liabilities and assets at the
heart of the traditional banking system that creates the risk of bank runs and
financial instability.
B. The Fragility of the Shadow Banking System
However, the shadow banking system is not regulated like the traditional
banking system.  It is also not explicitly encompassed within the federal gov-
ernment’s safety net for depository institutions.37  Instead, this safety-net role
is supposedly played by cash-like or cash-equivalent securities used as collat-
eral, a traditional private market self-help mechanism.  Due to the shadow
banking system’s foundational reliance on collateral, bank-like regulation
originally seemed unnecessary.  It was assumed that market forces would con-
trol risk taking in this system.38  Hence, borrowed funds (often via repo trans-
actions) were not—and still are not—protected by federal deposit insurance
nor do shadow banks have access to the Federal Reserve’s discount window, a
standing liquidity facility, if their funding dries up.  However, as recent crises
have demonstrated, private market securities collateral often loses its “cash-
like” or “cash-equivalent” status and becomes information sensitive (illiquid)
in stressed markets.  When this happens, a liquidity crisis, which could lead to
a credit crisis, ensues.
As collateral flows are at the core of liquidity in the shadow banking
system, they impact financial market stability.39  Hence, the increased inci-
dence of credit provided by securities markets challenges traditional limits of
central bank collateral frameworks.  To provide assistance to this system, cen-
tral banks must lend to a broader array of counterparties and against a
greater variety of collateral than they traditionally would.  Major central
banks such as the Federal Reserve have taken actions, such as large-scale asset
purchases, to assist this system, now giving them a “substantial footprint” in
collateral markets.40
Financial assets act as “a storage facility for liquidity.”41  However, liquid-
ity is dynamic and valuable.42  When market participants have access to
liquidity insurance via central bank liquidity facilities, their incentive to pru-
dently manage their liquidity needs decreases.43  If market participants lose
36 Id. at 7.
37 The federal safety net for banks consists of federal deposit insurance, Fedwire, and
the Federal Reserve’s lender of last resort function. See George G. Kaufman & Peter J.
Wallison, The New Safety Net, REGULATION, Summer 2001, at 28.
38 Singh & Stella, supra note 24, at 82.
39 See id.
40 BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, supra note 20, at iii.
41 Nyborg, supra note 1, at 4.
42 Baker, supra note 17, at 78–79 (discussing the underpricing of liquidity risk by
financial markets).
43 Kohn, supra note 31.
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confidence in the quality of private securities collateral and only lend against
the safest collateral (U.S. Treasuries), regardless of counterparty considera-
tions, market liquidity will dry up and trouble ensues.  For example, in the
financial crisis, market participants lost confidence in highly rated, asset-
backed securities based on subprime collateral.44  When this happens, a
“classic adverse feedback loop” is triggered,45 with a dynamic resembling that
of a traditional bank run.  However, instead of withdrawing bank deposits,
wholesale depositors or liquidity providers either stop lending against such
securities collateral or demand steep haircuts (discounts).46  Either path cre-
ates the dynamic of a bank-like run because both reduce the amount of fund-
ing a shadow bank, such as a Lehman Brothers or a Bear Stearns, is able to
borrow against its securities assets.
In sum, securities collateral enables the market-based credit system and
can have a stabilizing effect on financial markets.  Yet when markets suddenly
view collateral formerly judged as cash-like and “good” to now be informa-
tion-sensitive and “bad,” then securities collateral can have a systemically
destabilizing effect.  In stressed markets, having securities collateral viewed as
“good” instead of “bad” is critical.47  Just ask the former executives of Leh-
man Brothers.
In the financial crisis, credit creation plummeted when the market for
collateral roughly halved from $10 trillion to about $5 trillion.48  To prevent
the shadow banking system from collapsing, central banks engaged in asset
swaps49 of “good” collateral for “bad” collateral and expanded the monetary
base.50  Indeed, in such moments, market participants are likely to hold onto
“good” collateral and exchange their “trashy collateral” with central banks.51
Central banks injected liquidity into the shadow banking system via this col-
lateral exchange.52  In essence, the flexibility of central bank collateral
frameworks is the public elasticity that has supported money creation in the
shadow banking system.53
However, “bad” or “trashy” collateral is riskier for a central bank’s bal-
ance sheet than “good” collateral.  Collateral swaps can also involve fiscal
44 Id.
45 See Tarullo, supra note 25, at 3.
46 See Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo, 104 J.
FIN. ECON. 425 (2012) (explaining the bank-like runs in the repo markets at the heart of
the financial crisis).
47 Singh, supra note 19, at 14.
48 Id. at 11.
49 “Asset swaps” is a term used in BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, supra note 20, at 1.
50 Singh & Stella, supra note 24, at 86–87.
51 See Izabella Kaminska, Opinion, A Tale of Two Collateral Markets, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 19,
2011), https://www.ft.com/content/a8197def-f586-34f1-bbfd-f6de6053c27a (commenting
on market participants’ collateral swaps with the European Central Bank).
52 See Singh & Stella, supra note 24, at 87–91.
53 See Menand, supra note 14, at 58 (explaining that “the Fed was designed specifically
to address the fact that private money creation requires public elasticity when asset prices
fall”).
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considerations, an arena traditionally outside the remit of central banks.54
Although the Federal Reserve provided extensive emergency assistance to the
shadow banking system in the financial crisis,55 the reforms that followed fell
short of addressing the system’s fragility and vulnerability to bank-like runs.
In particular, securities financing transactions, collateral-centered transac-
tions whose benefits include increasing the liquidity of collateral in normal
markets and endowing more private market assets with money-like features,56
remain highly vulnerable to runs.57  In March 2020, as the adverse economic
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic escalated, the Federal Reserve once again
provided extensive assistance to the shadow banking system.58
It may be appropriate for central banks such as the Federal Reserve to
“do whatever it takes”59 to prevent credit markets from collapsing in the
midst of a financial crisis.  As a practical matter, history suggests that this is
the path that will be followed.  However, private market asset creation, the
market for collateral, and market participants’ management of liquidity risk
is not independent of central bank collateral frameworks in times of normal,
and especially distressed, markets.  Hence, it is critical that these frameworks
balance the credit creation needs of an economy with the risk of subsidizing
private markets for trashy collateral.  The next Part examines central bank
collateral frameworks.  It then demonstrates that through these frameworks,
central banks act in and are acted upon by private markets.
II. CENTRAL BANK LIQUIDITY PROVISION AND COLLATERAL FRAMEWORKS
A. Central Bank Liquidity Provision
Central bank money (liquidity) is at the heart of modern economies.60
It acts as a “binding constraint” on banks, being necessary for meeting
reserve requirements, deposit withdrawals, and transaction settlements.61
Central bank collateral frameworks impact its allocation throughout an econ-
omy62 because central bank money is issued against collateral on terms
defined by these frameworks.63
54 See Singh & Stella, supra note 24, at 88.
55 See Pozsar et al., supra note 26, at 3 (detailing liquidity provision by the Federal
Reserve to the shadow banking system during the financial crisis).
56 Jeremy C. Stein, Member, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., The Fire-Sales
Problem and Securities Financing Transactions (Nov. 7, 2013).
57 See Tarullo, supra note 25, at 8.
58 See Menand, supra note 14, at 12–18; see also Rajdeep Sengupta & Fei Xue, The
Global Pandemic and Run on Shadow Banks, kcFED ECON. BULL., May 11, 2020, at 1, 3–4.
59 In July 2012, Mario Draghi, then the head of the European Central Bank, famously
remarked that the central bank would “do whatever it takes” to preserve the Euro. See Dan
McCrum, Mario Draghi’s ‘Whatever It Takes’ Outcome in 3 Charts, FIN. TIMES (July 25, 2017),
https://www.ft.com/content/82c95514-707d-11e7-93ff-99f383b09ff9.
60 Nyborg, supra note 1, at 1.
61 Id. at 4.
62 Id. at 5.
63 Id. at 1.
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During periods of normal market functioning, central banks generally
conduct open market operations (OMO) with eligible counterparties and
have standing liquidity facilities for eligible counterparties.64  For example,
the Federal Reserve engages in permanent65 and temporary66 OMO.67  The
former consists of purchases and sales of securities, while the latter consists of
repurchase agreements.68  Eligible collateral in permanent OMO is generally
narrow, for example, U.S. Treasury securities, agency securities, and agency
mortgage-backed securities (MBS).69  Collateral for temporary OMO also
generally consists of U.S. Treasury securities, agency debt, and agency MBS.70
The Federal Reserve provides lending assistance largely71 to depository
institutions via its standing liquidity facility, the discount window.72  Here,
there has traditionally been a wider range of collateral eligibility than in
OMO.73  However, depository institutions are highly regulated, supervised,
and restricted in the types and amounts of securities assets they are permitted
to hold.  Hence, there are bounds on the type of collateral a depository insti-
tution would have available to secure loans from the central bank.  The Fed-
64 See BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, CENTRAL BANK COLLATERAL FRAMEWORKS AND PRAC-
TICES 4 (2013).
65 Permanent Open Market Operations, FED. RSRV. BANK OF N.Y., https://www.newyork
fed.org/markets/pomo_landing.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2021).
66 Repo and Reverse Repo Agreements, FED. RSRV. BANK OF N.Y., https://www.newyorkfed.
org/markets/domestic-market-operations/monetary-policy-implementation/repo-reverse-
repo-agreements (last visited Jan. 28, 2021).
67 “Open market” is arguably a misnomer because these transactions are limited to a
select group of institutions, “primary dealers,” rather than all market participants. Id.
68 Credit and Liquidity Programs and the Balance Sheet: Open Market Operations, BD. OF
GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS., https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/
bst_openmarketops.htm (last updated Aug. 13, 2019).
69 See id.
70 Repurchase and Reverse Repurchase Transactions, FED. RSRV. BANK OF N.Y., https://
www.newyorkfed.org/aboutthefed/fedpoint/fed04.html (Aug. 2007).
71 I use the word “largely” because I have argued elsewhere that as Dodd-Frank’s Title
VIII liquidity authority uses the disjunctive phrase “unusual or exigent” rather than the
conjunctive “unusual and exigent” as in the case of the Federal Reserve’s section 13(3)
emergency authority, this liquidity authority is arguably a standing facility, and it is to be
provided under the same statutory provision as discount window lending, a standing facil-
ity.  It allows for the provision of liquidity assistance to designated financial market utilities
in merely “unusual” times if all other statutory requirements are met.  Banks do not use the
discount window in usual times. See Baker, supra note 17, at 110.
72 Scholars have argued that the discount window is a regulatory mechanism. See Peter
Conti-Brown, The Mythology of Walter Bagehot: Part I of II, YALE J. ON REGUL.: NOTICE & COM-
MENT (Oct. 15, 2014), https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/the-mythology-of-walter-bagehot-part-
i-of-ii-by-peter-conti-brown/.
73 See Pledging Collateral, FED. RSRV. DISCOUNT WINDOW, https://www.frbdiscountwin-
dow.org/RightNavPages/Pledging-Collateral.aspx (last visited Jan. 28, 2021).  Regulation
A states that “[s]atisfactory collateral generally includes United States government and fed-
eral-agency securities, and, if of acceptable quality, mortgage notes covering one-to four-
family residences, state and local government securities, and business, consumer, and
other customer notes.”  12 C.F.R. § 201.3(a)(2) (2020).
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eral Reserve also has standing foreign currency swap lines, which enable it to
enter currency swaps with foreign central banks.74  In these transactions, a
foreign central bank borrows dollars and collateralizes the loan with a
deposit of its own currency in an account for the Federal Reserve at the for-
eign central bank.75  While these are standing liquidity facilities, the swap
lines can be characterized as a hybrid standing/emergency facility as the Fed-
eral Reserve has expanded the number of eligible foreign central bank
counterparties in crises.76
Central banks also play a last resort lending role in financial market cri-
ses to a more expansive set of market participants and against a broader array
of collateral.  The Federal Reserve’s statutory emergency lending authorities
are its section 13(3) authority77 and its liquidity authority for designated
financial market utilities (FMUs) in Title VIII of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”).78  Both are discussed
in more detail in the next Part.
Prior to the financial crisis, the Federal Reserve’s collateral framework
was narrow in comparison to that of central banks such as the European
Central Bank.79  However, in the financial crisis and in the COVID-19 pan-
demic, the Federal Reserve greatly expanded both the types of counterparties
74 Central Bank Liquidity Swaps, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS., https://
www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/central-bank-liquidity-swaps.htm (last updated
July 29, 2020); see also Colleen Baker, The Federal Reserve’s Use of International Swap Lines, 55
ARIZ. L. REV. 603, 618–28 (2013).  The Federal Reserve made its swap lines a permanent
standing facility in October 2013.  Jeff Black, Central Banks Make Swaps Permanent as Crisis
Backstop, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 31, 2013), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-
10-31/ecb-makes-crisis-cash-lines-at-central-banks-permanent.
75 Baker, supra note 74.  In theory, the Federal Reserve could also borrow the foreign
currency and collateralize the loan with U.S. dollars.
76 In the coronavirus pandemic, the Federal Reserve has expanded the number of its
swap-line counterparties. See Serena Ng & Nick Timiraos, COVID Boosts Fed as Global
Lender—Foreign Loans Mark Significant Expansion of Power and Cement the Dollar’s Dominance,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 4, 2020, at A1.
77 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2018); see also Baker, supra note 17; Parinitha Sastry, The Political
Origins of Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act, FED. RSRV. BANK N.Y. ECON. POL’Y REV., Sept.
2018, at 1, 1–2.
78 12 U.S.C. § 5465(b) (2018).  It is unclear that this is a true emergency liquidity
authority.  The statutory language uses the phrase “in unusual or exigent circumstances”
rather than “in unusual and exigent circumstances” as in the Federal Reserve’s longstand-
ing section 13(3) emergency authority.  Baker, supra note 17, at 110.
79 SAMUEL CHEUN, ISABEL VON KÖPPEN-MERTES & BENEDICT WELLER, EUR. CENT. BANK,
THE COLLATERAL FRAMEWORKS OF THE EUROSYSTEM, THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM AND THE
BANK OF ENGLAND AND THE FINANCIAL MARKET TURMOIL 11 (2009).
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and the collateral eligible to secure its liquidity assistance.80  These decisions
have at times been controversial.81
B. Central Bank Collateral Frameworks
 Professor Kjell Nyborg states that “monetary and financial systems are fun-
damentally built on top of the collateral that central banks choose to accept
in exchange for central bank money.  To understand money and the broader
financial system, it is therefore necessary to understand central bank collat-
eral frameworks.”82  A number of considerations shape the contours of cen-
tral bank collateral frameworks and influence their evolution, including
central bank legislation, central bank policy and expertise, operational
requirements, and a country’s financial market structure.83  Post–financial
crisis, collateral frameworks have generally broadened asset eligibility and
refined their haircut (initial margin) policies.84
The main institutional design features of collateral frameworks are col-
lateral eligibility, haircut policy, counterparty eligibility, and various opera-
tional parameters.85  Collateral frameworks can be broad or narrow and
include discretionary components.86  The broader a framework, the greater
the potential for adding risk to the central bank’s balance sheet.  Collateral
frameworks can be uniform, having the same standards for standing liquidity
80 Some of these expansions were at the direction of Congress, while others were not.
In the financial crisis, more than half of the collateral backing Federal Reserve lending
facility liquidity consisted of corporate loans, residential home loans, and consumer loans.
Id. at 29.  It also included significant amounts of private market asset-backed securities
(including MBS) and agency MBS. See id.  For overviews of Federal Reserve liquidity assis-
tance in the financial crisis, see generally MICHAEL J. FLEMING, FED. RSRV. BANK OF N.Y.
STAFF REPS., FEDERAL RESERVE LIQUIDITY PROVISION DURING THE FINANCIAL CRISIS OF
2007–2009 (2012); MARC LABONTE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44185, FEDERAL RESERVE: EMER-
GENCY LENDING (2020); and, in the COVID-19 pandemic, see Menand, supra note 14.
81 The Federal Reserve accepted risky securities collateral (speculative-grade and equi-
ties) from Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley that Lehman Brothers had in significant
amounts. See Ball, supra note 6, at 13; see also Gabilondo, supra note 17, at 737 (noting “the
Fed lent against seemingly dubious collateral” in the crisis); Matthew Leising, Fed Let Bro-
kers Turn Junk to Cash at Height of Financial Crisis, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 1, 2011), https://
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-03-31/fed-accepted-more-defaulted-debt-than-
treasuries-as-rescue-loan-collateral; The Editorial Board, Opinion, Fed’s Junk Bond Purchases
Should Be Short-Term, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 17, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/d53d77d8-
7fe0-11ea-8fdb-7ec06edeef84.
82 Nyborg, supra note 1, at 34.
83 See BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, supra note 64, at 3, 33.  The Federal Reserve’s
collateral framework has evolved since its creation.  For example, the Real Bills doctrine
held a prominent place in its early history. See Judge, supra note 4, at 70; Sastry, supra note
77, at 7.  An account of this history is beyond the scope of this Essay.
84 BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, supra note 64, at 1 (collecting data on the collateral
frameworks of twelve central banks at different points in time).
85 Operational parameters refer to operation size, transaction term, and allocation
method.  BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, supra note 20, § 3.4, at 31.
86 BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, supra note 64, at 5.
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facilities and OMOs, or differentiated on the basis of these functions.87  If
the latter, standing facilities tend to have a broader range of eligible assets,88
as in the case of the Federal Reserve.  Central banks manage collateral via
pooling (linking loans to a pool of collateral), earmarking (linking loans to
specific collateral), or a mixture of these arrangements.89
An asset’s “collateral value” is based upon the haircut (if any) to the
market or model (theoretical) value of an eligible asset.90  Central banks rely
upon markets, economic models, and third parties, such as credit rating
agencies, to price eligible assets.  Both haircuts and any limits on the concen-
tration of collateral are a critical part of central bank collateral frameworks
and risk management.91  Accurate haircutting of eligible assets is tremen-
dously important, especially in the case of illiquid assets.  The pricing of illiq-
uid assets is likely to be based upon economic models and will impact its
“degree of pledgeability,”92 which in turn should impact its supply and
demand.  Prudent haircutting practices protect not only the central bank,
but also avoid providing markets with incentives to overinvest in such assets,
public subsidies to trashy collateral, and implicit rescue to insolvent
entities.93
The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) states there is a “complex
interrelationship between operational frameworks of central banks and mar-
kets for collateral,”94 that central banks act on collateral markets “intention-
ally and unintentionally,”95 and that their actions have two primary channels
of impact: one of scarcity and one of structure.96  The former, illustrated in
Figure 1 below, results “from the impact of central bank operations on the
prices, rates, and price volatility of collateral assets arising from changes in
the availability of collateral, or the collateral composition of the market,” and
the latter “include[s] effects from the designation of eligible securities, as





90 See Nyborg, supra note 1, at 19.
91 See BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, supra note 64, at 11.
92 See BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, supra note 20, § 3.2, at 24.
93 See Nyborg, supra note 1, at 12, 15–16.
94 BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, supra note 20, at iii.
95 Id. at 1.  The three main ways in which central banks can impact collateral markets
are through monetary policy operations, promoting financial stability, and providing/sup-
porting financial market infrastructure. Id. at 6.
96 Id. at 10.
97 Id. at 10–11.
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FIGURE 198
Collateral frameworks can harness market discipline, but they can also
circumvent it.99  This is potentially troublesome.  These frameworks have a
tremendous impact on markets and on market discipline in a number of ways
as Figure 2 below suggests.  First, eligible collateral is inherently more liquid
in markets and will trade at a premium in comparison to ineligible collat-
eral.100  Second, collateral frameworks can be used to improve bank balance
sheet liquidity by making illiquid collateral eligible and subject to minimal
haircuts.101  Third, collateral frameworks can incentivize banks to hold less
liquid collateral and relax bank incentives to monitor debtors.102  Fourth,
collateral frameworks can incorporate political considerations, for example,
by favorably treating government guaranteed or politically preferred
assets,103 or even treating disadvantageously politically disfavored assets.104
98 Id. at 13 fig.2.
99 See Nyborg, supra note 1, at 26, 29.  Nyborg argues that the Eurosystem’s collateral
framework relies minimally on markets, that “it appears that many features of the frame-
work are designed to circumvent market discipline,” and that it is “biased towards . . . lower
quality collateral.” Id.  Furthermore, “[t]here appears to be a preference, or bias, towards
the usage of more illiquid and risky collateral that has increased over time.  The produc-
tion of lower quality collateral has increased as well.” Id. at 29.
100 See Nyborg, supra note 12.
101 Id.
102 Nyborg, supra note 1, at 15.
103 Nyborg, supra note 12.
104 This possibility is suggested by recent instances in which politically favored/disfa-
vored businesses arguably received disparate treatment by various actors in the banking
system. See, e.g., Colleen M. Baker, Entrepreneurial Regulatory Legal Strategy: The Case of Can-
nabis, 57 AM. BUS. L.J. 911 (2021); Julie Andersen Hill, Regulating Bank Reputation Risk, 54
GA. L. REV. 523, 533 (2020); Brian Knight & Trace Mitchell, Private Policies and Public
Power: When Banks Act as Regulators Within a Regime of Privilege 3–4 (Oct. 2019)
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As a central bank’s balance sheet increases, so will its risk and the opportu-
nity for political pressures to shape it, which could pose a risk to the central
bank’s reputation and independence.105  Fifth, collateral frameworks can
provide arbitrage opportunities to banks by impacting the cost of pledging
different assets.106  Lastly, collateral frameworks can affect indirect bailouts
of financial institutions or sovereigns.107
FIGURE 2108
In sum, “collateral frameworks may have distortive effects on financial
markets and the wider economy.”109  The less liquid an eligible asset, the
more a central bank will rely on model (theoretical) pricing.  This discretion
risks price distortion, which ultimately risks providing a generous pricing
floor for and incentivizing overinvestment in junk securities.  This is prob-
lematic.  Mispriced risk is at the core of financial crises.  Hence, collateral
frameworks can support financial market stability, but they can also ulti-
(unpublished manuscript) (https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/knight-banks-as-regu-
lators-mercatus-working-paper-v1.pdf).
105 See Nyborg, supra note 1, at 10 (quoting Klaas Knot, President, Neth. Bank, Central
Bank Independence and Unconventional Monetary Policy—Challenges for the European
Central Bank (Oct. 15, 2013)).
106 Id. at 30; see also Kaminska, supra note 51.
107 Nyborg, supra note 12.
108 BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, supra note 20, § 3 fig.4, at 20.
109 Nyborg, supra note 1, at 2.
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mately contribute to systemic risk and promote financial market instability as
they act in and are acted upon by markets.
C. Central Banks Act in and Are Acted upon by Markets Through Collateral
Frameworks
Professors Robert C. Hockett and Saule T. Omarova argue that govern-
ment can assume one or more of four market actor roles in the “[m]urky
[m]iddle” that exists between the poles of public (government) and private
(market) activity.110  In these roles, “government instrumentalities act on
markets by acting in them.”111  Via their collateral frameworks, central banks
assume all of these roles.  As a market maker, government steps into the mar-
ket as a counterparty or a buyer of last resort, essentially “underwriting” prod-
ucts, which “affords confidence to the would-be marketer of the product in
question to go ahead and ‘bring it to market,’ since this seller need no longer
bear the risk of non-sale.”112  Economists and legal scholars have noted that
the Federal Reserve acted as a market maker of last resort in the financial
crisis.113  Many argue that given the structure of modern credit markets, the
Federal Reserve should act as a market maker of last resort.114  The Federal
Reserve has assumed this role in practice by the elasticity or expansion of its
collateral framework, and expanding eligible assets and counterparties.
In the related role of market preserver, the government sustains or back-
stops markets that would otherwise be extinguished.115  Here too, a central
bank’s collateral framework is the instrumentality that enables this role in
practice.  It empowers the central bank to make accommodative or favorable
decisions regarding collateral assets in a specific market.  In the market-lever-
ing role, the government guarantees certain assets by providing a “secondary
market or higher-order risk-pooling arrangement,”116 or “plays a standard-
setting or related coordination problem-solving role by favoring a particular
standard in its own influential market acting.”117  Consequently, it decreases
the costs of certain assets, which incentivizes their production.118  Collateral
frameworks can advantage (subsidize) certain assets not only by making them
eligible to secure liquidity assistance, but also by imposing a minimal (if any)
110 Robert C. Hockett & Saule T. Omarova, “Private” Means to “Public” Ends: Governments
as Market Actors, 15 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES LAW 53, 54–56 (2014).
111 Id. at 76.
112 Id. at 58.
113 See, e.g., PERRY MEHRLING, THE NEW LOMBARD STREET: HOW THE FED BECAME THE
DEALER OF LAST RESORT 2 (2011); Baker, supra note 17, at 71.
114 See, e.g., Willem Buiter & Anne Sibert, The Central Bank as the Market Maker of Last
Resort: From Lender of Last Resort to Market Maker of Last Resort, VOXEU (Aug. 13, 2007),
https://voxeu.org/article/subprime-crisis-what-central-bankers-should-do-and-why. But see
Kohn, supra note 31 (stating “that central banks should not allocate credit or be market
makers on a permanent basis”).
115 Hockett & Omarova, supra note 110, at 69.
116 Id. at 66.
117 Id.
118 See id. at 65–66.
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haircut.119  Finally, through its market-moving role, the government impacts
market prices.120  An example of this is OMO by central banks.121  Here too,
it is the central bank’s collateral framework that will determine the collateral
markets in which it acts on prices.
Professors Hockett and Omarova argue that government uses its market-
actor role “for public rather than private ends”122 and that its actions in vari-
ous roles are not necessarily indefinitely efficient.123  This latter caveat is
especially important for central bank collateral frameworks, a consummate
example of government as market actor.  This is because central bank collat-
eral frameworks could incentivize overinvestment in bad collateral should
they become viewed as a dependable lender or buyer of last resort.124  In this
way, markets act on central banks and push the boundaries of their collateral
frameworks.  Hence, the institutional features of specific frameworks will
determine their efficiency and whether this government market-actor role
ultimately promotes public rather than private ends.
III. COLLATERAL REQUIREMENTS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE’S SECTION 13(3),
DODD-FRANK TITLE VIII, AND SWAP-LINE LENDING AUTHORITIES
This Part analyzes the Federal Reserve’s post–Dodd-Frank collateral
frameworks in the context of its section 13(3) emergency authority, its lend-
ing authority for designated financial market utilities, and its central bank
swap lines.  In particular, it analyzes the current balance between legislation
and central bank policy in this area and general implications of these
arrangements.
Congress established the Federal Reserve’s section 13(3) emergency
liquidity authority in 1932, enabling it to lend to nondepository institutions
in “unusual and exigent circumstances.”125  Prior to the financial crisis, the
Federal Reserve had last used this authority in the 1930s.126  In the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA), Con-
gress made a small, but seismic, change to this power.127  Previously, the Fed-
eral Reserve Act limited the collateral eligible for securing such loans to “the
kinds and maturities made eligible for discount for member banks under
other provisions of this chapter.”128  In general, this meant government
119 See Nyborg, supra note 12.
120 See Hockett & Omarova, supra note 110, at 65.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 56.
123 Id. at 67.
124 Nyborg, supra note 1, at 12.
125 See Sastry, supra note 77, at 1.
126 See id.
127 See Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.
102-242, § 473, 105 Stat. 2236, 2386 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2018)).
128 See id.
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securities or collateral related to commercial transactions.129  Post FDICIA,
such lending merely had to be “secured to the satisfaction of the Federal
reserve bank.”130
The Federal Reserve made extensive use of its section 13(3) emergency
liquidity authority during the financial crisis.131  As legal scholars have noted,
Dodd-Frank subsequently curtailed this liquidity authority.132  However, they
have not generally focused on the collateral-related amendments.  Post-
Dodd-Frank, collateral-backing section 13(3) lending would have to be “suffi-
cient to protect taxpayers from losses.”133  Additionally,
[t]he policies and procedures established by the Board [of Governors of the
Federal Reserve] shall require that a Federal reserve bank assign, consistent
with sound risk management practices and to ensure protection for the tax-
payer, a lendable value to all collateral for a loan executed by a Federal
reserve bank.134
Dodd-Frank also requires that after a two-year period, the Federal Reserve
disclose “information identifying the types and amounts of collateral pledged
or assets transferred in connection with participation in any credit facility or
covered transaction.”135
The Federal Reserve amended Regulation A, “Extensions of Credit by
Federal Reserve Banks,” to implement Dodd-Frank’s amendments.136  Its
proposed rule received fewer than twelve comments.137  Suggestions
included limiting the types of collateral eligible for emergency lending and
requiring an independent valuation of the collateral.138  The Federal Reserve
incorporated neither suggestion in the final rule.  It explained that
[t]he final rule continues to emphasize the importance of ensuring that the
security for emergency loans is sufficient to protect taxpayers from
losses . . . .  [A]ll credit extended under emergency lending programs and
facilities must be indorsed or otherwise secured to the satisfaction of the
lending Federal Reserve Bank.139
129 Walker Todd, Rewarding Bad Behavior: The Bear Stearns Bailout, INST. FOR NEW ECON.
THINKING (Mar. 12, 2018), https://www.ineteconomics.org/perspectives/blog/rewarding-
bad-behavior-the-bear-stearns-bailout.
130 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2018); see Walker F. Todd, FDICIA’s Emergency Liquidity Provisions,
29 ECON. REV., no. 3, 1993, at 16, 20.
131 See Sastry, supra note 77, at 1–2.
132 See, e.g., Hal S. Scott, The Federal Reserve: The Weakest Lender of Last Resort Among Its
Peers, 18 INT’L FIN. 321, 322 (2015); see also Baker, supra note 17.
133 12 U.S.C. § 343.
134 Id.
135 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, § 1103(b)(1)(D), 124 Stat. 1811–12 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5465 (2018)).  This
requirement covers emergency lending, discount window lending, and OMOs. See id.
136 See Extensions of Credit by Federal Reserve Banks, 80 Fed. Reg. 78,959 (Dec. 18,
2015).
137 Id.
138 Id. at 78,960.
139 Id. at 78,962.
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Furthermore, it added, “[t]he Federal Reserve Banks have long assigned a
lendable value to collateral at the time credit is extended”140 and “[i]n all
cases, the Reserve Bank applies appropriate discounts or ‘haircuts’ to the
value of the collateral,” which are available on its website.141  In sum, it is
unclear that Dodd-Frank’s collateral-related amendments to the Federal
Reserve’s section 13(3) emergency authority had much practical effect or
shifted the equilibrium between legislation and central bank policy in its col-
lateral framework for this emergency authority.
In Dodd-Frank’s Title VIII, “Payment, Clearing, and Settlement Supervi-
sion,” the Federal Reserve is granted a new liquidity authority for financial
market utilities (FMUs),142 which are critical infrastructure institutions such
as derivatives clearinghouses,143 that have been designated as systemically
important by the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC).144  This
authority provides that in “unusual or exigent circumstances,” the Federal
Reserve “may authorize a Federal Reserve bank” under section 10B of the
Federal Reserve Act,145 which addresses “Advances to individual member
banks on time or demand notes; maturities; time notes secured by mortgage
loans covering one-to-four family residences,” to lend to designated FMUs.
However, Dodd-Frank does not contain collateral-related provisions for this
new authority.  Such lending must merely be “secured to the satisfaction of
such Federal Reserve bank.”146  Even if Dodd-Frank had included collateral-
related provisions in this liquidity authority similar to those it added to the
section 13(3) liquidity authority, it is unclear what (if any) impact such lan-
guage would have in practice.  However, the delayed collateral-disclosure
requirements are likewise applicable here.147
Thus far, the majority of the eight designated FMUs are clearinghouses,
which have unique balance sheets.  As Professor Darrell Duffie explains:
140 Id.
141 Id.  The Federal Reserve’s haircut schedule for commonly pledged collateral is at
Discount Window Margins and Collateral Guidelines, FED. RSRV. DISCOUNT WINDOW, https://
www.frbdiscountwindow.org/pages/collateral/discount%20window%20margins%20and
%20collateral%20guidelines (last updated Oct. 23, 2020).
142 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act §806(b), 12 U.S.C.
§ 5465 (2018).  For an overview of the Federal Reserve’s Title VIII liquidity authority, see
Baker, supra note 17, at 117.
143 Clearinghouses are critical financial market infrastructures used in the post-trade
process. See Colleen M. Baker, Incomplete Clearinghouse Mandates, 56 AM. BUS. L.J. 507, 507
(2019).  Several types exist.  Derivatives clearinghouses promote transactional efficiencies,
manage counterparty credit risk, and are the centerpiece of global policymakers’ frame-
work of reforms in the over-the-counter derivative markets. Id. at 526–27.  Dodd-Frank
provided the Federal Reserve with the authority to grant accounts and services to desig-
nated FMUs. Id. at 518.
144 See Designated Financial Market Utilities, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS.,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/designated_fmu_about.htm (last
updated Jan. 29, 2015).
145 12 U.S.C. § 347b (2018).
146 12 U.S.C. § 347b(a).
147 See Dodd-Frank Act § 1103.
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The balance sheet of a CCP is quite different from those of other major
types of systemically important financial institutions such as banks, broker-
dealers, and insurance companies. . . .  The bulk of the financial risk of a
CCP is not represented by conventional assets and liabilities.  Rather, a CCP
is essentially a nexus of contracts by which its clearing members net and
mutualize their counterparty default risk.  In the normal course of business,
the daily payment obligations of a CCP automatically sum to zero.  Because
of this, a CCP tends to have tiny amounts of equity and conventional debt
relative to its largest potential clearing obligations.  Most of the tail risk of a
CCP is allocated to its clearing members.148
Consequently, if the Federal Reserve were to assist a distressed clearinghouse,
it is not only unclear whether substantial collateral would be available to
secure such lending, but it is also unclear what type of collateral would be
available.  For example, if a designated credit default swap (CDS) clearing-
house were distressed due to the default of one or more members, could a
portfolio of CDS secure such assistance?  Is the Federal Reserve’s collateral
framework sufficiently elastic for CDS to be eligible collateral and should it
be?149  The equilibrium between legislation and central bank policy in the
Federal Reserve’s collateral framework for designated FMUs leans predomi-
nantly toward central bank policy.
Finally, the Federal Reserve has expanded its standing central bank swap
lines to additional counterparties in crises.150  Foreign central banks turn
around and lend these dollars to domestic institutions.151  These U.S. dollar
loans are collateralized by a deposit of the foreign central bank borrower’s
currency in an account of the Federal Reserve at that central bank.  Hence,
these loans are nontraditionally secured.152  Potential differences in the bor-
rower’s collateral framework could create collateral-arbitrage opportunities
for global financial market participants.  Commentators suggest that
“[u]nless central banks act collectively to re-establish control of quality collat-
eral markets, no matter how much liquidity they provide against trashy collat-
eral—it won’t make much of a difference.”153
The Federal Reserve has used its swap lines extensively.  However, this
liquidity facility is not based on an explicit statutory provision.154  Histori-
148 Darrell Duffie, Resolution of Failing Central Counterparties, in MAKING FAILURE FEASI-
BLE: HOW BANKRUPTCY REFORM CAN END “TOO BIG TO FAIL” 87, 88 (Kenneth E. Scott,
Thomas H. Jackson & John B. Taylor eds., 2015).
149 See Baker, supra note 17, at 103 & n.222 (arguing that in extreme circumstances, the
Federal Reserve might have to essentially lend against or buy a CDS portfolio as arguably in
the case of AIG).
150 See Ng & Timiraos, supra note 76.
151 See Baker, supra note 74, at 603.
152 The legal authority for the Federal Reserve’s swap lines is beyond the scope of this
Essay.  For research on this issue, see Baker, supra note 74, at 622–23; Peter Conti-Brown &
David Zaring, The Foreign Affairs of the Federal Reserve, 44 J. CORP. L. 665, 690–96 (2019);
Menand, supra note 14.
153 Kaminska, supra note 51.
154 See Baker, supra note 74, at 628.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\96-4\NDL401.txt unknown Seq: 20  9-APR-21 18:03
1400 notre dame law review [vol. 96:4
cally, a patchwork of statutory provisions has been used to justify this
power.155  Thus far, Congress has chosen not to take any legislative action in
this area except to require in Dodd-Frank that were such lending used for a
nongovernmental third party, that it be disclosed after two years.156  Hence,
the equilibrium between legislation and central bank policy in the Federal
Reserve’s collateral framework for its swap lines tilts almost exclusively toward
central bank policy.
The normative equilibrium between legislation and central bank policy
in collateral frameworks is tremendously important.  Among the critical
issues at stake are who primarily decides credit/fiscal policy, discipline in col-
lateral markets, characteristics of the central bank’s balance-sheet risk, and
the central bank’s flexibility in responding to crises.  The BIS states that:
Overall, a pragmatic approach was taken [in the financial crisis] to secure
credit in order to deal with the evolving situation and manage collateral scar-
city.  This suggests that it is difficult, ex ante, to establish principles about
what collateral will be acceptable in all situations.  This argues in favour of
relatively flexible collateral frameworks.  This is particularly the case in times
of systemic liquidity stress, when the demand for central bank-eligible collat-
eral increases rapidly.157
Indeed, it is highly foreseeable that central banks will be incredibly pragmatic
in a crisis, and that some flexibility is needed in their collateral frameworks.
Yet as Donald Kohn, former Vice Chairman of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve, notes:
[M]arket participants must reassess their assumptions about the stability of
secured funding in circumstances in which the liquidity of the markets for
the underlying collateral becomes impaired. . . .  [T]he existence of central
bank credit facilities can so undermine incentives for maintaining liquidity
buffers that institutions hold more longer-term assets than is socially desira-
ble and thereby pose excessive risk to themselves and the financial
system.158
CONCLUSION
The tremendous importance of central bank collateral frameworks and
of collateral securities to modern credit markets is clear.  This Essay high-
lights the near absence of these frameworks in the legal scholarship, their
general institutional features, and the equilibrium between legislation and
central bank policy in the context of three of the Federal Reserve’s emer-
gency lending authorities.  The author plans future research in this area
designed to explore the proper normative equilibrium between legislation
155 See id. at 610.
156 See Baker, supra note 17, at 122 n.312 (explaining the statutory basis for the author’s
assertion of this requirement).
157 BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, supra note 20, §2.2, at 9.
158 Kohn, supra note 31, at 3.
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and central bank policy to best promote market discipline and to minimize
credit allocation by central banks via their collateral frameworks.
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